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Abstract
In this paper we present the results of the study of Sicilian Mafia organization by using Social
Network Analysis. The study investigates the network structure of a Mafia organization, de-
scribing its evolution and highlighting its plasticity to interventions targeting membership and
its resilience to disruption caused by police operations. We analyze two different datasets about
Mafia gangs built by examining different digital trails and judicial documents spanning a period
of ten years: the former dataset includes the phone contacts among suspected individuals, the
latter is constituted by the relationships among individuals actively involved in various criminal
offenses. Our report illustrates the limits of traditional investigation methods like tapping: crimi-
nals high up in the organization hierarchy do not occupy the most central positions in the criminal
network, and oftentimes do not appear in the reconstructed criminal network at all. However, we
also suggest possible strategies of intervention, as we show that although criminal networks (i.e.,
the network encoding mobsters and crime relationships) are extremely resilient to different kind
of attacks, contact networks (i.e., the network reporting suspects and reciprocated phone calls)
are much more vulnerable and their analysis can yield extremely valuable insights.
Keywords: social network analysis, network science
1. Introduction
Sicilian Mafia (often known as Cosa Nostra) is a criminal organization which originated in
Sicily and, after decades of emigration waves, it is now spread worldwide [1, 2, 3].
Police investigations revealed that Mafia is a loose confederation of smaller syndicates (called
“cosche”, “clan” or “Families”) such that each syndicate takes the control of a specific territory
(usually a town or a part of it) by organizing and overseeing illegal activities. Members of a
Mafia syndicate can be both mobsters and associates (i.e., people like drug-dealers, murders or
corrupted politicians who are not part of the syndicate but contribute to its illicit activities). Mafia
syndicates show a strong hierarchical organization [2]: on the top of the organization we have a
“boss”, who is aided by an “underboss” and by various “liutenants” who head branches of the
Mafia syndicate. The boss also commands a crew of “soldiers” (often known as picciotti) who
commit acts of violence like intimidation, threats and murders.
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Due to its normative structure as well as strong ties with finance, entrepreneurs and politi-
cians, Mafia has now risen to prominence as a worldwide criminal organization by controlling
many illegal activities like the trade of cocaine, money laundering or illegal military weapon
trafficking [4].
Understanding the structure of Mafia syndicates, unveiling the functional role of each of their
members and quantify the ability of a Mafia syndicate to react to the detention of its members
are crucial steps to effectively fight and dismantle Mafia syndicates. In the latest years, various
researchers [2, 5, 6] illustrated the benefits of using Social Network Analysis [7] to study the
structure criminal organizations.
The adoption of methods from Social Network Analysis in the study of criminal organiza-
tions has strong theoretical and practical motivations: studies from sociological literature (known
as social facilitation models [2]) point out that the membership of an individual to a crime gang
enormously amplifies her/his tendency to criminal behaviors [8]. Destroying the network struc-
ture associated with a criminal organization is central to prevent individuals from committing
crimes and lower delinquency rates.
The first step to analyze Mafia syndicates by means of Social Network Analysis tools is
to collect a sufficiently large data sample describing the various units composing the syndicate
and their operations. Interactions among mobsters materialize under various forms: for instance
two mobsters can be tied if they committed together the same crime or if they have been seen
together in the same sighting. A powerful and well-known investigation method is tapping, i.e.,
the procedure of recording information flow among suspected criminals which has been sent
using any type of electronic media, like phone calls (from both fixed lines and mobiles), emails,
SMS messages and private communications over Social Media platforms. Tapping has proven
to be effective for preventing and solving many crimes like terrorism, drugs, kidnapping and
political corruption.
Tapping has been extensively used also in case of Mafia related investigations, but, if used
alone, it may fail to reliably capture the structure of a Mafia syndicate: newspapers, for instance,
report that the boss of Mafia syndicates often reveal their whereabouts to just few gang members
and, in many cases, they issue orders and communications through handwritten notes known as
pizzini. 1
A promising investigation strategy requires to supplement information collected by tapping
with data generated by other methods of investigation like video surveillance, use of informants
and under-cover agents, interview to subjects, analysis of bank transactions and so on. By gluing
together this piece of information, we can capture a more detailed picture of the structure of a
Mafia syndicate. Unfortunately, the information cited above is the outcome of a long, expensive
and often dangerous investigation process which often spans years, or, in certain cases, even
decades.
After examining several types of judicial documents spanning a ten years period (like judg-
ments, verdicts, depositions and inquisitions, and so on) we built two datasets about Mafia gangs
operating in the North of Sicily.
We started by collecting phone calls among suspected individuals and this allowed us to
build a network called contact network Ncon in which each individual was associated with a
vertex and an edge between two vertices denotes the existence of at least one reciprocated phone
call between the individuals associated with that vertices. The network Ncon contained 1, 716
vertices and 8,481 edges.
1See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4899512.stm
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By means of further investigation, we were able to identify crime relationships: we say
that a crime relationship exists between two individuals if they took part in the same criminal
offense or if they have been seen together during a sighting. Criminal relationships were then
mapped on a second network called criminal network Ncri. The network Ncri contained only 104
vertices and 2,596 edges: all but 6 individuals in the criminal network were also present in the
contact network. This means that the original dataset contained almost all mobsters but there
were mobsters who were part of the Mafia syndicate but who never used mobiles or fixed lines
to communicate.
The availability of these datasets offered us the unprecedented opportunity of understanding
the actual structure of a Mafia syndicate and to quantify how well it is able to react to police
operations leading to the detention of some of its members. In a first stage of our research,
we studied the structural properties of Ncri and Ncon. Our first goal was to understand whether
meaningful differences arise between the structural features of the two networks.
Subsequently, we investigated and compared the robustness of Ncon and Ncri. We simulated
a police operation leading to the arrest of a fraction f of individuals from the two networks and
we studied how these perturbations impacted on the structure of both Ncon and Ncri. Individuals
were selected either randomly or on the basis of their centrality in the network. To this end, we
used three different centrality metrics, namely Degree Centrality (DC), Betwenness Centrality
(BC) and Closeness Centrality (CC). We considered two type of operations, namely: (i) Parallel
Attack, i.e., we assumed that a fraction f of individuals were simultaneously deleted from the
network along with their connections and (ii) Sequential Attack. i.e., we supposed to iteratively
neutralize individuals along with their connections from the network until a fraction f of indi-
viduals has been neutralized. To measure the effectiveness of each operation, we computed two
parameters, namely the size of the Strongly Connected Component (SCC) of each network and
the Average Path Length (APL) (defined as the mean of shortest path lengths in the network).
The main findings of our analysis can be summarized as follows:
1. We found that 98 (out of 104) members of Ncon were also members of Ncri; there were also
6 mobsters who appeared in Ncri but were not recorded in Ncon. This proves the presence
in the contact network of few criminals who do not use phones to communicate because
they consider phone calls unreliable and unsafe.
2. The degree distribution in Ncon followed a power law k−α with α = 2.5. By contrast, the
degree distribution in Ncri was almost uniform and about 76.92% of Ncri affiliates had a
degree ranging between 15 and 85. With the help of police officers, we observed that
leaders in the Mafia syndicate were the individuals in Ncri showing the lowest degree.
Therefore, the top elements in a Mafia syndicate do not occupy the most central positions
in the criminal network.
3. Social relationships were dense both in Ncon and Ncri. To this end, we computed the Av-
erage Clustering Coefficient of each vertex as function of its degree and we found that it
was always bigger than 0.6 (i.e., more than 5 times the value measured on social networks
like Facebook [9, 10]). This is likely to depend on the recruiting policies of Mafia syndi-
cates which impose the existence of intermediaries to enable an individual to join a Mafia
syndicate.
4. In case of a parallel police operation, we observe that targeted attacks are able to quickly
destroy the strongly connected component of Ncon. In particular, DC has the most disrup-
tive effect on SCC. In contrast, Ncri showed an exceptional degree of robustness indepen-
dently of the adopted centrality index.
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5. In case of sequential police operations, the CC has the most disruptive effect on SCC and
this happens both in Ncon and in Ncri. CC is still the best option if the goal is to increase
APL in Ncon; by contrast, DC yields the largest increase in APL if applied on Ncri.
The plan of the paper is as follows: in Section 2 we discuss the related literature. In Section 3
we provide some basic definitions which will be largely used throughout the paper. In Section
4 we describe the main structural features of both the Contact and the Criminal Network while
Sections 5 and 6 are devoted to investigate the resilience of the Contact and Criminal networks
under parallel and sequential attacks, respectively. Finally, in Section 7 we draw our conclusions
and illustrate our future research plans.
2. Related Literature
In this section we review the scientific literature related to our approach. We start discussing
how Social Network Analysis techniques have been applied to study Mafia-related organizations
(Section 2.1). We then illustrate approaches concentrating on how the power of a criminal orga-
nization depends on the social relationships among its members (Section 2.2). One of the major
contributions of our study, in fact, consists of exploring the effects associated with the dismissal
of one (or more) members of a criminal gang.
2.1. Social Network Analysis and Mafia syndicates
One of the early reports on the structure of Mafia syndicates dates back to 1876 and is due
to the Italian deputy Leopoldo Franchetti [1], who depicted the Mafia as a criminal organization
deeply rooted in Sicilian society. Franchetti argued that Mafia was impossible to destroy unless
a deep change in Sicilian social institutions would occur.
Such a study has deeply influenced prosecuting magistrates, politicians, criminologists and
sociologists committed to fighting Mafia. Mafia syndicates are organized according to rigid
normative structures, being perhaps the Mafia Decalogue the most popular code of conduct.
According to that Decalogue, mobsters must respect each other: for instance, it is forbidden to
appropriate money if it belongs to other members of the same syndicate or to other families. Ties
among mobsters belonging to the same syndicate are very strong: in some cases they are related
by blood and, in any case, the gang comes before their birth family.
Because of the rich and strong web of relationships among mobsters, the analysis of the
social structure of a Mafia syndicate is of great scientific interest and it well explains why Social
Network Analysis methods have been extensively applied to the study of Mafia syndicates.
For instance, Morselli [6] studied the connections within a New York-based family (the Gam-
bino family). The study focused on the career of one of its members, Saul Gravano. One of the
main Morselli’s findings is that Gravano’s ability of building and extending over time his personal
network of contacts was a key factor to climbing the Gambino’s family organization. Natarajan
[11] studied a dataset consisting of 2,408 wiretap conversations gathered during the prosecution
of a heroin-dealing Mafia syndicate in New York. Starting from available data, the author built a
network of phone calls, which revealed a group of 294 individuals forming the core of the crim-
inal organization. Natarajan showed that most of the group members had very limited contacts
with others in the group.
Other relevant studies are reported by Sarnecki [12] (who applied Social Network Analysis
to study co-offending behaviors among Swedish teenagers) and by McGloin [3] (who analyzed
the network structure of street gangs in Newark, New Jersey).
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Social Network Analysis is not only a tool to describe the structure and functioning of a
criminal organizations but it has been largely employed in the construction of crime prevention
systems [13]. For instance, Xu and Chen [14] jointly applied Social Network Analysis with hi-
erarchical clustering algorithms; the proposed approach worked in two stages: first, a criminal
network was partitioned into subgroups by means of a clustering algorithm. Then, block model-
ing techniques have been used to extract interaction patterns between these subgroups. A further
application of Social Network Analysis to crime detection is reported in [15], which focused on
money laundering.
Social Network Analysis tools were finally employed to identify leaders within a criminal
organization. For instance, Mastrobuoni and Patacchini [2] used a dataset recording criminal
profiles of 800 Mafia members active in the United States from 1950s to 1960s to investigate
the structure of criminal ties between mobsters. Various features were considered like family
relationships, legal and illegal activities, to predict the criminal rank of a mobster.
In our previous work we focused on the joint application of Social Network Analysis tools
and advanced Data Visualization techniques [5, 16]. We described a software system which
was able to extract criminal organizations from a network recording mobile phone calls and we
combined statistical network analysis primitives, community detection algorithms, and visual
exploration tools, to unveil the structure of criminal networks hidden in communication data.
This paper introduces many novelties with respect to the approaches cited above. In fact,
our analysis focuses on two datasets which roughly cover the same time interval and refer to the
same geographical area. The first dataset records phone calls while the second one is about crime
relationships and, as will become clear in the following, the networks extracted from each dataset
show deep differences from a structural viewpoint. Our work highlights the limits of tapping as
investigation method to fight against Mafia gangs and it shows that the most prominent criminals
do not occupy the most central positions in the criminal network. The procedure we followed
to build the datasets in this paper essentially relies on the analysis of judicial documents like
verdicts of depositions. An approach to collecting crime related data which is ortoghonal to ours
is described by Furtado et al. [17]. In that paper, the authors describe WikiCrime, a Web applica-
tion that enables its users to directly report crimes on a specific geographical area and temporal
window, or to search for a specific crime occurred in the past. One of the core features of Wiki-
Crime is its ability to give more transparency and diffusion to criminal information and to prevent
crimes. As claimed by the authors, WikiCrime is also effective to reduce under reporting, i.e.,
the fact that some crimes are not notified to law enforcement authorities. WikiCrime integrates
a reputation module to verify the credibility of generated information: on the one hand, in fact,
the collaboration of large masses of users enables to quickly and cheaply collect vast amount of
data. On the other hand, the source of available data is often unknown and, therefore, it is hard
to determine if the information is credible and accurate.
Concluding, we point the interested reader to the informative and comprehensive review
recently compiled by D’Orsogna and Perc [18] that summarizes current efforts in computational
modeling of crime from a statistical physics perspective.
2.2. The power of criminal organizations and social interactions
Many researchers studied what are the best policies to fight (and hopefully dismantle) a
criminal organization. Most of these studies highlight the importance of social relationships as a
multiplier of the aptitude of single individuals to commit crimes. For instance, one of the early
contribution is due to Sah [19], who proposed a crime model based on social interactions. The
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key point of that study is that the severity of punishment perceived by an individual as a conse-
quence of her/his illicit behaviors depends on her/his social setting. As a result some individuals
(under the influence of their peers, the social environment they live in and the institutions with
whom their interact) may consider the punishment as not severe and this is more conducive to
criminal actions. An interesting study by Gleaser et al. [20] classified individuals in a criminal
network as conformist (if they simply imitate the behaviors of their peers) and non-conformist (if
they decide on their own to commit/not commit crimes). The studies reported above highlight
that the structure of social ties among members of the same community as well as the culture
individuals have been exposed to may have a crucial impact on their tendency to commit crimes.
The main question deriving from these studies is how to perturb a criminal network to reduce the
aptitude of its members to commit crime.
Ballester and collaborators [21] suggested a key-player policy which targets at removing the
criminal who reduces the most the level of criminality in a gang. Such a policy was more effective
than traditional punishment policies. Borgatti [22] defined a different approach for key-players
finding based on qualitative features of vertices rather than a mere quantitative evaluation of their
centralities. Unfortunately, such an approach requires access to further information that might
not be readily available to the investigators, or might be dangerous to collect in the context of
criminal investigation.
Liu et al. [23] analyzed delinquent networks of adolescents in the United States with the
goal of detecting the criminal(s) who, once removed, generate the highest possible reduction in
aggregate crime level. They found that in delinquent adolescent networks, key players are more
likely to be male, have less educated parents, are less attached to religion and feel socially more
excluded.
In this paper we consider a similar problem, i.e., we focused on finding what police strategy
has the most disruptive effect on the structure of a Mafia gang. Our analysis and the collaboration
with experts from local law enforcement agencies highlight that, in Mafia syndicates, the key
players are not the best connected mobsters: in fact, the criminals occupying leadership roles in
Mafia gangs often prefer not to use phones to communicate. In addition, we observed that bosses
were not concentrated on a specific region of the criminal network but they were uniformly
spread in the network. This encodes the fact that bosses often belong to different family units.
As a consequence, the task of arresting bosses is extremely difficult and dangerous. As a further
result, this paper shows that the criminal network (i.e., the network encoding mobsters and crime
relationships) is extremely resilient to different kind of attacks while the contact network (i.e., the
network recording suspected individuals and reciprocated phone calls) is much more vulnerable.
3. Background
In this section we briefly introduce centrality scores (Section 3.1), and then we illustrate the
concept of network robustness (Section 3.2).
In the following we define a network N = 〈V, E〉 as a pair in which V is the set of vertices
and E is the set of edges. The symbol 〈i, j〉 denotes an edge in E.
A network N can be represented through its adjacency matrix A, which is defined as follows:
Ai j = 1 if (and only if) there is an edge going from the vertex i to the vertex j, 0 otherwise. In
the following we suppose that A is symmetric, i.e., if an edge 〈i, j〉 belongs to E, then the edge
〈 j, i〉 belongs to E too.
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3.1. Centrality in Networks
The centrality of an individual, represented by a vertex i, in a network N is a measure of the
importance of i in N. A large number of centrality indices has been considered in the literature
(see [7] for an excellent review). In our study we focused on three centrality indices, namely: (i)
Degree Centrality (hereafter, DC), (ii) Betwenness Centrality (BC) and (iii) Closeness Centrality
(CC).
We have chosen these indices because they have a clear geometrical interpretation and, then,
the notion of importance they implement is easy to understand. These indices rely on comple-
mentary philosophies: as for DC, in fact, it is based only on the local connectivity of a vertex
and it requires to know only the number of neighbors of a vertex. More formally, given a vertex
i, its degree centrality DC(i) is defined as the number of edges incident onto i. The BC and CC
indices are based on the concept of shortest path (also known as geodesic path) in a network:
given an unweighted and undirected network and a pair of vertices i and j the shortest path con-
necting i and j is the path consisting of the fewest number of edges. According to the literature
[24], shortest paths are preferential pathways to convey and spread messages in a broad range of
networks like biological or social networks.
Some authors [25, 26, 27, 28] argued that the assumption that information travels along
geodesic paths may not hold true in real scenarios: for instance, in case of large online social
networks like Facebook, users are agnostic about the whole network topology and, therefore, they
are not able to find shortest paths and use them to convey messages. In addition, the computation
of shortest paths is computationally unfeasible even on moderately large networks.
In case of criminal networks, however, we guess that geodesic paths are to be preferred to
randomly generated paths (i.e., random walks). Criminal networks are much smaller than other
types of social networks and we can afford to compute geodesic paths. In addition, to ensure
secrecy in the transmission of information, shortest paths are to be preferred to longer ones: it is
known that criminals systematically try to expose sensitive information to a minimal number of
trusted others.
On the basis of these considerations, we claim that the importance of a vertex i depends on
the fraction of shortest paths passing through i because this means that i is able to intercept a
relevant portion of the information flowing through the network. This intuition naturally leads to
introduce the Betweeness Centrality BC(i) of a vertex i which can be formally defined as follows:
let i, u and w be any three distinct vertices in a network and let σuw be the number of shortest
paths from u to w; finally, let σuw(i) be the number of the shortest paths from u to w passing
through i. We define BC(i) as:
BC(i) =
∑
i,u,w∈V
σuw(i)
σuw
(1)
Alternatively, we may classify i as important if its “distance” from other vertices in the net-
work is small because this certifies the ability of i to communicate with other vertices and con-
tribute to the information spreading. There are, of course, various possible definitions of distance
between network vertices. The simplest one perhaps consists of measuring the distance between
two vertices i and j as the length SP(i, j) of the shortest path connecting them. Bearing in mind
such a notion of distance, we define the Closeness Centrality CC(i) of i as the reciprocal of the
sum of all geodesic distances from i to all other vertices in the network [29]:
CC(i) =
1∑
u∈V SP(u, i)
(2)
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Some experiments devoted to study collaboration in social groups show that individuals per-
ceived as leaders are those users who generally feature high closeness values [29].
3.2. Network Robustness
The study of network robustness (i.e., the ability of a network to react to the failure of some
of its components [30, 7]) is strongly linked to studies about the reliability of many biological
and artificial systems.
A system S , in fact, can often be modeled as a network N = 〈V, E〉 such that each vertex in
V identifies one of the components of S while edges describe interactions among components.
The system S is said to be robust if it can maintain its functions even if some of its components
fail or they stop interacting [30].
The robustness of S greatly depends on the topological structure of N and on the existence of
multiple paths connecting two vertices in N. To gain an understanding, let us refer to a commu-
nication network whose devices exchange messages by means of suitable physical links. In an
extreme case, suppose that the network presents a star topology: if we would remove the center
of the star (along with the edges coming out from it), we would disconnect the whole network.
Another extreme example occurs if we consider a clique: in such a case the removal of an arbi-
trary vertex would have no impact on the network functioning. Between these extreme cases, we
observe that the malfunctioning of one or more components (or physical links) may not prevent
a source component from correctly interacting with a target one because the source component
could find alternative paths. This observation legitimates a popular approach to studying network
robustness: we study the fragmentation processes taking place in the network by progressively
deleting vertices from N along with their connections [30, 31]. Real networks often include a
large, strongly connected component (hereafter SCC) retaining most of the network vertices. Af-
ter deleting some vertices along with their incident links, other vertices could detach from SCC to
form small clusters (or even remain isolated). Because of this fragmentation process, we expect
the network to become less and less connected and this implies that the size of the SCC decreases.
Analogously, the network diameter and the Average Path Length APL (i.e., the mean of pairwise
shortest path lengths) should also increase, thus making communication between vertices more
difficult. According to the literature [9], APL is a more robust parameter than diameter: in fact,
the existence of a long shortest path in the network would imply a large network diameter even
if vertices are, on average, only few hops away.
Albert and collaborators [30] focused on the robustness of two classes of networks, namely:
(i) homogeneous networks in which the probability P(k) that an arbitrary vertex has degree k
exponentially decays for large values of k; and, (ii) heterogeneous networks, in which P(k) fol-
lows a power law distribution. Examples of homogeneous networks are the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random
graph or the small world model by Watts and Strogatz [7]. Examples of heterogeneous networks
include the Internet [32], the World Wide Web [33], and in general most (large-scale) social [34],
and techno-social systems [35]. In their experiments, the authors considered both artificial and
real networks (i.e., a sample of Web pages and hyperlinks connecting them) and empirically
measured the size of the SCC and the diameter of the network if an increasingly larger fraction f
of vertices was removed [30].
Two vertex removal strategies were considered: in the former strategy, vertices were ran-
domly selected while in the latter one the most connected vertices were progressively deleted
from the network one by one.
In case of homogeneous networks, no substantial variation in network diameter emerged if
vertices were selected at random or in a decreasing order of connectivity.
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A completely different behavior was observed for heterogeneous networks: the random re-
moval of vertices had no effect on the diameter while if the most connected vertices were deleted,
then the diameter would quickly increase.
An analogous study was later proposed by Broder et al. [31], which took a sample of the
World Wide Web graph and removed Web pages on the basis of the number of their outgoing
hyperlinks. Conforming to the previous study [30], the authors found that it was sufficient to
remove Web pages referred by at least other five pages to destroy the Web connectivity [31].
4. The structure of Contact and Criminal Networks
As pointed out in the introduction, we used two datasets (see Table 1) to analyse the structural
properties of Mafia syndicates and their resilience to both random and targeted attacks. The first
dataset describes phone calls among suspected criminals located in the North of Sicily. We
refined such a dataset by considering further methods of investigation (e.g., stakeout, search in
private residence with a search warrant, access to personal bank account information and so on).
In this way we built a second dataset recording actual mobsters and crime relationships between
them: two mobsters are tied by an edge if they took part in the same criminal offense). Both the
two datasets refer to a Mafia syndicate operating in the North of Sicily.
We call Contact Network Ncon = 〈Xcon, Econ〉 the network extracted from the first dataset
where Xcon = {x[con]1 , x[con]2 . . . , x[con]n } is the set of individuals (nodes) subject to tapping or found
in the phone call logs by law enforcement agencies and Econ ⊆ Xcon ×Xcon is the set of edges that
connect pair of nodes. The set of edges Econ is composed of all phone relationships (voice calls,
SMS, MMS, etc.). In this work, the edges Econ are considered as undirected and unweighted,
thus disregarding the orientation and the number of contacts between two any vertices.
Criminal Network Ncri = 〈Xcri, Ecri〉 is the network obtained from the second dataset where
Xcri = {x[cri]1 , x[cri]2 . . . , x[cri]m } is the set of individuals subject to deepened investigations by law
enforcement agencies by taking into account other kind of relationships among them. The set
Ecri ⊆ Xcri ×Xcri comprises relationships among components of Ncri not telephone-based such as
joint bank transactions, complicity in a crime, and so on.
We call N[con] = (n[con]i j ) ∈ Nn×n the adjacency matrix of N[con] given by:
n[con]i j =
{
1 if 〈x[con]i , x[con]j 〉 ∈ E[con],
0 otherwise,
(3)
and, analogously, with N[cri] = (n[cri]i j ) ∈ Nm×m the adjacency matrix of N[cri] given by:
n[cri]i j =
{
1 if 〈x[cri]i , x[cri]j 〉 ∈ E[cri],
0 otherwise,
(4)
Now we define the aggregate network A[aggr] = 〈Xaggr, Eaggr〉 where Xaggr = Xcon ⋃ Xcri,
Eaggr = Econ
⋃
Ecri and the aggregated topological adjacency matrix associatedA[aggr] = (a[aggr]i j ) ∈
N|Xaggr |×|Xaggr | given by:
a[aggr]i j =
{
1 if n[con]i j ∨ n[cri]i j = 1,
0 otherwise,
(5)
of the unweighted network obtained from Ncon and Ncri by joining all pairs of nodes i and j
which are connected by an edge in at least one network and neglecting the possible existence of
multi-ties between a pair of nodes and the nature of each tie as well [36].
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Network |V | |E| 〈k〉 APL Diameter SCC
Contact Network (Ncon) 1716 8481 9.88 2,75 6 1
Crime Network (Ncri) 104 2596 49.92 1.53 3 1
Aggregated (Aaggr) 1722 11070 12.86 2.73 6 1
Table 1: Some statistics about Ncon and Ncri. For each network we report the number of vertices (|V |), the number of
edges (|E|), the average degree (〈k〉), the Average Path Length (APL), the diameter and the size of the strongly connected
component (SCC). We also report the same statistics for the aggregate networks Aaggr obtained from Ncon and Ncri by
joining all pairs of nodes i and j which are connected by an edge in at least one network.
(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 1: Left panel: We report a graphical representation of Ncon: here a vertex is associated with a suspected mobster
while an edge indicates that the two suspects called each other at least once. Yellow vertices correspond to bosses, green
vertices identify lieutenants, and blue vertices identify associates that were later arrested by law enforcement agencies.
The size of each vertex is proportional to its degree, and the same holds for the color coding: light yellow is associated
to nodes having the minimum degree and red is used for nodes having the maximum degree. Center panel: Graphical
representation of Ncri, namely mobsters and crime relationship between them (e.g., complicity in a crime, acquaintance,
police inspections, bank transactions, etc.) Right panel: we show the aggregate network Naggr where we highlighted
vertices corresponding to bosses of the criminal organization (yellow) together with vertices 13, 15, 26, 54, 76 ∈ Ncri not
belonging to Ncon, corresponding to mobsters that were never tapped during investigations.
In Table 1 we report some statistics about Ncon and Ncri. For each network we indicate the
number of vertices (|V |) and the number of edges (|E|). We observe that Ncri contains only 104
vertices while Ncon has 1, 716 vertices. However, Ncri contains 2,596 edges and, therefore, it is
much denser than Ncon which contains only 8,481 edges. For this reason the average number of
edges per vertex is only 9.88 in case of Ncon and it amounts to 49.92 in case of Ncri. This means
that, on average, each vertex in Ncri is connected with half of the vertices of Ncri.
In Figure 1(a) we provide a graphical representation of Ncon. The size of each vertex is
proportional to its degree. We used different colors to pinpoint the role of mobsters in the Mafia
syndicate: in yellow we report the leaders of the organization (the so-called “boss”). Green
vertices represent lieutenants, i.e., the heads of a branch of a Mafia syndicate who commands
a crew of soldiers (known as picciotti) and reports directly to the boss. Blue vertices represent
actual mobsters, i.e., individuals who are known to be members of the syndacate. Blue vertices
in the phone traffic network are not key network actors as they are spread all over the structure of
the network, oftentimes in peripheral positions. In fact, both their position and ranking are often
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not prominent.
Figure 1(b) shows the criminal network of dataset Ncri. It is composed of 2590 links re-
ferring to relationships other than telephone-based contacts among the vertices of the network
(for example but not only, complicity in a crime, acquaintance, police inspections, bank trans-
actions, etc.) found by the prosecutors during the investigations. Ncri includes the subset Icri =
{13, 26, 84, 15, 76, 54}whose members are not present in Ncon. They are mobsters that were never
tapped during investigations. The structure is characterized by two clusters (clans) tied together
by the subset Lcri = {14, 15, 48, 49} ⊂ Ncri whose members are the so-called lieutenants (in
green). As expected, the bosses (yellow vertices) of subset Bcri = {100, 101, 102, 103, 104} are
situated between the two clusters, have a small number of links and at first look are not marginal.
Figure 1(c) represents the aggregated network Aaggr which comprises the overall structure of
the two networks in study. We highlighted the vertices representing the bosses Bcri (in yellow)
together with the members of the subset Icri ⊂ Ncri not belonging to Ncon. The density of connec-
tions among the elements of Ncri changes the structure of network Naggr. Indeed, the two clusters
of Ncri appears in the center, so that a core is formed.
From Table 1 —which summarizes information about the datasets— and from the graph-
ical representations shown in Figure 1, we can conclude that almost every member of crimi-
nal network Ncri under arrest is also a member of network Ncon. Interestingly, telephone-based
relationships among associates are rare in Ncon. Indeed only seven links were found, namely
Ccri = {(90, 2), (104, 87), (50, 87), (28, 87), (33, 87), (19, 87), (23, 93)}.
It is known that associates are aware of investigative techniques and are inclined to minimize
direct telephone-based communications. Direct communications are accomplished by interme-
diaries without a criminal record, above suspicion and unknown to law enforcement agencies.
This feature is clearly illustrated in Figure 2(a) in which all telephone-based connections are
shown among vertices Xcri and a subset of most central vertices belonging to Ncon. In our opin-
ion this is one of the most strategic elements to assure the resilience of a network. In this way a
criminal network is not exposed to destabilizing attacks of law enforcement agencies because it
manages a very limited number of telephone-based contacts among the members of the network.
Nevertheless communications are still spread via elements that are not directly ascribable to the
network.
Figure 2(b) shows the connections of network Ncri and those among the members of Bcri
and Ncon. In this case some of the most central vertices of the network Ncon are implicated.
The egonets of bosses {102, 103, 104} are shown in Figure 2(d). Finally, Figure 2(c) shows
the subgraph Naggr which comprises of all the criminal and telephone-based connections of Ncri
where we highlighted the vertices of the subset Icri.
The analysis of vertices of bosses and their position within the structure of the network gives
an important insight in the study of resilience of a criminal network. As we can see in Figure 3(a),
bosses of the organization do not occupy important positions in the network Aaggr. Nevertheless
they are connected to the most important vertices in terms of degree. Even in this case, relations
among the most authoritative members of the organization are limited in time and amount. They
manage the overall network indirectly via trusted people that not necessarily belong to the crim-
inal network. In Figure 3(b) this concept is even more evident. Two subgraphs are shown which
are obtained from the union of the egonets of the bosses of the set Bcri, precisely of the subgraph
Bego1 = {101ego} ⋃{103ego} e Bego2 = {100ego}⋃{102ego}⋃{104ego} in which the bosses are con-
nected to very few strategic vertices to guarantee communications and flow of orders towards all
the members of the criminal network. Direct connections among the bosses of the set Bego1 and
the set Bego2 within the network Aaggr (the bosses of the two groups never had telephone-based
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(a)
(b) (c)
(d)
Figure 2: Panel (a): We show all connections among the vertices belonging to Xcri together with a subset of Ncon having
a high value of degree. Panel (b): We show the edges of the network Ncri together with the edges connecting the
elements of Bcri and Ncon. Panel (c): We show all criminal and telephone-based connections of network Ncri and we
highlight (zoom) vertices of subset Icri. Panel (d): We shown the egonets of bosses {102, 103, 104} filtered via the tool
LogAnalysis [16]. The black lines represent edges of set Ecrim, the grey lines represent edges of set Econ. Color codes:
yellow vertices represent bosses, green vertices represent lieutenants, blue vertices represent associates. Red vertices
denote members of the telephone-based network Ncon.
communications among them, had meetings escaping the investigations, were never charged of
the same crime, never left evidence of bank transactions, etc.). This is a further element of re-
silience of the criminal network: the removal of a vertex from a subgroup has no consequences
on the other subgroup. Nevertheless the bosses are tightly tied and occupy the uppermost posi-
tion in the criminal organization. This is why in Figure 2(d) we decided to include even missing
relations (not present in the datasets), in order to increase the meaning of the visualization.
4.1. Analysis of the structural properties of contact and criminal networks
The next step of our analysis consists of studying the structural properties of Ncri and Ncon.
To perform our analysis we considered two main parameters:
Degree Distribution. Given a vertex i in Ncon (resp., Ncri), we compute its degree ki in
Ncon (resp., Ncri). From the analysis of the degree distribution it is possible to check if there
are vertices in Ncon (resp., Ncri) which are much more connected than other or, vice versa, if the
number of connections of each individual is roughly the same.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3: Left panel: Network Aaggr in which are highlighted the egonets of the bosses Bcri of the criminal network.
Right panel: Subgraphs Bego1 ⊂ Aaggr and Bego2 ⊂ Aaggr of the egonets of the bosses obtained as the union of the egonets
of every vertex of Bcri.
Average Clustering Coefficient. Given a vertex i in Ncon (resp., Ncri), we define the neigh-
borhood of level 1 N(i) associated with i as the set of vertices which are adjacent to i in Ncon
(resp., Ncri).2 The average clustering coefficient ACCi of i is defined as follows:
ACCi =
2 × |{〈v,w〉 : v ∈ N(i),w ∈ N(i)}|
ki × (ki − 1)
Here, {〈v,w〉 : v ∈ N(i),w ∈ N(i)} is the set of pairs of vertices v and w which are connected
each other and, simultaneously, are both connected to i. The triplet formed by vertices i, v and w
is also called closed triplet and, therefore, ACCi measures the number of closed triplets having a
vertex in i out of the total number of triplets of vertices that contain i. The ACCi ranges in [0, 1]
and if it is nearly equal to 1 then the neighbors of i tend to form a large number of triangles which
favors the spreading of information.
We begin our study by discussing the vertex degree distribution in both Ncon and Ncri. As for
Ncon, we plotted the Cumulative Complementary Distribution Function CCDF which specifies,
for a fixed threshold k, the probability that a randomly selected vertex has degree greater than k.
We displayed the CCDF in Figure 4.1 on a log-log scale.
Similarly to many other socio-technical systems, contacts among individuals in Ncon are
rather sparse and unevenly distributed, with few vertices capturing most of the edges in Ncon.
We used the statistical tool described in [37] and we found that the degree distribution followed
a power law with α = −2.5 (p-value < 10−5).
Because of Ncon is quite dense, we adopted a different graphical procedure to investigate
vertex degree distribution. We ranked vertices in Ncri on the basis of their degree: in this way the
2The vertex i is not considered in N(i).
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Figure 4: The CCDF associated with the degree distribution ki in Ncon. We used a log-log scale and, in the same plot, we
report the power law distribution best fitting the experimentally observed data.
`-th ranked vertex is the vertex showing the `-th largest degree (see Figure 4.1).
We noticed few individuals who were connected to almost all other individuals in Ncon but
there was also a small number of individuals who were connected to few individuals and just one
of them was isolated (i.e., there was a vertex with degree 0). The vast majority of vertices in Ncon
had a degree ranging from 15 to 85.
In Ncon we found few individuals who are well connected with many other individuals but
the largest part of vertices shows a low degree. In contrast, in Ncri there were only 15 individuals
with degree less than 40 and only 17 individuals with degree larger than 55. This suggests the
possibility to partition individuals in Ncon in three disjoint classes on the basis of their degree,
namely: (i) Class A, if ki ≤ 15, (ii) Class B, if 15 < ki ≤ 85 and (i) Class C, if ki > 85.
With the aid of police officers, we observed that individuals belonging to Class A did not had
leadership roles in the gang but they often acted as intermediaries. Surprisingly enough, all the
heads of the gang were members of Class C and this depends on the fact that leaders in Ncri
are aware of risks and, therefore, they are in touch with just an handful of gang associates. The
density of Ncri is likely to depend on the nature of many crimes: activities like drug trafficking or
gambling impose mobsters to organize into gangs and coordinate their actions. This implies that
the resulting network must be dense and it well explains why the average degree is roughly 50,
i.e., any mobster is connected with half of the members of Ncri.
We continue our analysis by focusing on the structure of the social relationships of a given
individual in both Ncon an Ncri. Figure 4.1 shows the values of Average Clustering Coefficient as
function of vertex degree for both Contact and Criminal Networks. In case of Ncri, ACC features
generally low values and it is monotonically decreasing with the degree ki. We notice that ACC in
Ncri is always bigger than 0.6 which is a surprisingly large value: many socio-technical systems
and Web platforms like Facebook or MSN messenger, in fact, generally feature a value of ACC
in the range of 0.01 − 0.14 [9, 10]. In addition, ACC achieves its peak for Class B users. Such
a result can be paired up with our previous discussion: in Ncri there is a large fraction (which
account for roughly 90% of the whole population) of individuals with degree ranging from 40 to
60 and, at the same time, the contacts of these users are themselves well-connected each other.
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Figure 5: We report the degree of each vertex vs. its rank: the vertex with rank ` is the vertex having the `-th largest
degree. We split vertices on the basis of their degree and we obtained three classes, namely Group A (0 ki ≤ 15), Group
B (15 < ki ≤ 85) and Group C (ki > 85).
The abundance of triangles in Ncri depends on the normative structure governing syndicates.
In fact, past testimony [38] as well as documents found during the arrest of Mafia boss Salvatore
Lo Piccolo showed that one of the first rule in the Mafia decalogue was as follows: “No one can
present himself directly to another of our friends. There must be a third person to do it.”3
5. Resilience of criminal and contact networks in a parallel police operation
In this section we aim at studying the resilience of the contact and criminal networks at our
disposal to both random and targeted attacks. The resilience of a contact/criminal network is a
crucial parameter to quantify the ability of a Mafia syndicate to react to the arrest of some of
its members. More in general, Mafia syndicates tend to structure themselves in an way that is
resilient to police operations aiming at hindering or inhibiting temporarily or permanently the
functions of any specific member of the organization.
To assess network robustness in presence of the dismissal of some of its members we rely on
previous studies [30, 31] discussed in Section 3.2, and we consider two parameters: (i) the size
of the largest strongly connected component SCC and (ii) the average path length APL.
A large value of SCC implies that a pair of arbitrary selected individuals in Ncon (resp., Ncri)
is able to find a path (going through other individuals) along which a message can be routed.
Relatively small values of APL imply that, on average, a user has to go through a short chain of
3See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7086716.stm
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Figure 6: Top: Average Clustering Coefficient as function of ki in Ncon. Bottom: Average Clustering Coefficient as
function of ki in Ncri.
intermediaries to get in touch with any other individual and, in the crime context, a quick flow of
information is a crucial parameter to establish the survival of the organization itself.
We considered two attack strategies:
• Random attack strategy. We selected, uniformly at random, a fraction f of vertices from
Ncon (Ncri) and removed them along with their incident connections. We then measured the
corresponding variation of SCC and APL. To produce statistically robust results, we ran the
procedure described above 100 times and computed the average of SCC and APL. In our
experiment f varied from 1% to 25%.
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(a) (b)
Figure 7: Left panel: SCC vs. the fraction f of removed vertices in Ncon in case of parallel police operation. Right
panel: SCC vs. the fraction f of removed vertices in Ncri in case of parallel police operation.
• Targeted Attacks with DC, BC and CC strategies. We computed the centrality of each
vertex by applying one of the three centrality indices introduced in Section 3.1, i.e., Degree
Centrality (DC), Betwenness Centrality (BC) and Closeness centrality (CC). For each
centrality index, we sorted vertices on the basis of their centrality score and deleted a
fraction f of them from Ncon (Ncri) along with their connections. We then measured the
corresponding variation of SCC and APL. Once again, f varied from 1% to 25%.
The outcome of our experiments are graphically reported in Figures 7(a) -7(b).
As for SCC, we observe that targeted attacks are able to quickly destroy the strongly connected
component in case of Ncon. In particular, from Figure 7(a), DC has the most disruptive effect on
SCC and the removal of less than 5% of the most central vertices is enough to completely destroy
the largest connected component. Random attacks yield a linear decrease in SCC and if f shifts
from 5% to 25%, then SCC decreases of about 24%. BC and CC are respectively the second and
third most effective strategies, however they require, on average, a removal of between 15% and
20% if vertices to effectively disrupt SCC.
Different conclusions can be drawn if we focus on Ncri (see Figure 7(b)). Such a network
exhibits, in fact, an exceptional degree of robustness and, independently of the centrality index
we decided to adopt, we observe that SCC always decreases in a linear fashion. Here, BC yields
the largest decrease in SCC and the lines associated with DC and CC mostly overlap. This result
illustrates that there are no obvious targeted strategies that effectively disrupt a criminal network,
at least by using parallel police operations.
As a further experiment, we studied the variation of APL in Ncon and Ncri when an increasing
fraction of vertices was deleted from these two graphs under both random and targeted attacks
(see Figures 8(a) and 8(b)).
We observe that random attacks are ineffective to increase the value of APL in case of Ncon.
Indeed, in Ncon the most effective strategy is, once again, DC: we need to neutralize only
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Figure 8: Left panel: APL vs. the fraction f of removed vertices in Ncon in case of parallel police operation. Right
panel: APL vs. the fraction f of removed vertices in Ncri in case of parallel police operation.
the top 2% vertices from Ncon to nearly triplicate the APL. Yet using DC, if f > 4% the contact
network breaks into separate components. Analogous observations hold if we use BC and CC to
score vertices even if the breaking point roughly occurs again with f = 15 − 20%.
Random attacks are, de facto, ineffective in augmenting APL in Ncri.
Our experiments suggest that, in Ncon, it is sufficient to neutralize a small fraction of vertices
(around 5 − 7% if the DC strategy is adopted) to significantly reduce SCC and, simultaneously,
increase APL. In contrast, due to its high density of crime ties, Ncri is much more resilient and
therefore it is able to effectively react to targeted attacks.
6. Resilience of criminal and contact networks in a sequential police operation
We conclude our study by focusing on a different type of police operation that we call se-
quential scenario. In a sequential police operation, we wish to study how a criminal organization
is able to re-organize itself when one (or more of its members) are neutralized. We suppose that
mobsters are arrested one-by-one and we measure how each arrest impacts SCC and APL. This
leads us to design the following experimental procedure: (i) We select a vertex according to the
three centrality indices DC, BC and CC presented in Section 3.1; (ii) We neutralize the selected
vertex by deleting it along with its incident connections. (iii) We calculate SCC and APL on the
network obtained at the end of Step (ii). Steps (i)-(iii) are repeated until the top 30% vertices of
Ncon (resp., Ncri) are neutralized.
In Figures 9(a)-9(b) we plot the variation of SCC. We observe that CC has the most disruptive
effect on the reduction of SCC and this happens both in Ncon and in Ncri. In Figures 10(a) and
10(b) we plot the variation of APL when an increasing fraction f of vertices is neutralized from
Ncon and Ncri.
From these figures we observe that CC remains the best option to increase APL in Ncon; by
contrast, the application of DC yields the largest increase in APL if applied on Ncri.
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(a) (b)
Figure 9: Left panel: SCC vs. the fraction f of removed vertices in Ncon in case of a sequential police operation. Right
panel: SCC vs. the fraction f of removed vertices in Ncri in case of a sequential police operation.
(a) (b)
Figure 10: Left panel: APL vs. the fraction f of removed vertices in Ncon in case of a sequential police operation. Right
panel: APL vs. the fraction f of removed vertices Ncri in case of a sequential police operation.
To compare the effectiveness of parallel and sequential police operations, we focus only on
the results we achieved on Ncri.
From our results, it seems that a sequential police operation has to be preferred to a parallel
one: in fact, if we would remove the top 5% mobsters in a sequential police operation we would
reduce the size of SCC up to 65%. In contrast, in case of a parallel police operation, we obtain a
modest decrease in SCC of about 4.76% in case of a parallel operation. Similar results hold for
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APL. From this discussion, it seems that sequential strategies should be preferred to parallel ones
but, in practice, the identification of the best strategy to dismantle a Mafia gang is a really hard
task. First of all, in fact, police investigation last many years because of the need to collect a
large amount of evidence prior to arresting individuals. In most cases, law enforcement agencies
raid Mafia meetings held to discuss crime strategy and, thus, the end effect of this operation
is that some high-caliber mobsters are captured. Therefore, parallel police operations are more
realistic (and occurs much more frequently) than sequential ones. In addition, sequential police
operations would achieve the best results if the Mafia syndicate would slowly react. In real cases,
there are many events which may impose a Mafia network to re-organize: on the one hand, in
fact, we recount police operations but, on the other hand, we have feuds, i.e. conflicts between
opposite gangs often culminating in the murder of some gang members.
Mafia syndicates, as emerges from judicial documents, are able to instantaneously adapt
themselves to external events both at the group level (i.e., the Mafia gang may reform their inter-
nal organization by electing new bosses) and at the individual level (i.e., criminals may change
their behavior or temporarily suspend illicit actions to avoid being targeted by law enforcement
agencies).
7. Conclusions
In this work we presented an experimental analysis of the network structure and resilience of
Mafia syndicates. Thanks to collaborations with law enforcement, we were capable of collect-
ing a precious dataset of digital trails and judicial documents that span a period of ten years of
investigations of real crimes committed by such syndicates in the North of Sicily. The frame-
work we presented here consists of reconstructing two types of networks, namely a Contact and
a Criminal one. The former was constructed from phone-based communications involving sus-
pected individuals, while the latter is based on much stronger evidence of crimes involving actors
connected to Mafia syndicates. The sets of actors greatly overlap yet our work highlighted the
presence of a small number of high-end criminals who do not appear in the Contact network: this
suggests that prominent bosses in Mafia syndicates may not adopt technology to remain off the
radars during police investigations. This shows the limits of traditional investigation techniques
like tapping, and calls for the adoption of complementary methods that help shed light where
data cannot reach.
Given the unprecedented opportunity to adopt real data for our study, we here focused on in-
vestigating the resilience properties of Contact and Criminal networks. We found that Criminal
networks exhibits and exceptional robustness to targeted attacks, yet Contact networks are much
more vulnerable. We showed that various targeted strategies yield different effects of disrup-
tion with different performance, however we provide quantitative evidence that sequential police
operation should be preferred to parallel ones, although the latters are way more common and
secure, as they expose law enforcement agencies to less risks and potential violent encounters.
Our future research will focus on envisioning strategies of intervention that successfully com-
plement the insights we obtained from this analysis, while from a computational perspective we
aim at defining new methods to identify and predict crimes in the context of Mafia syndicates.
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